Saturday, October 31, 2015

Debate: Objective Morality Without God? (p. 2)

Home  >  Philosophy  >  Atheism/Theism

Preface



This is a debate between me and SeekSecularism over the truth of the first premise of the following moral argument:
  1. If God does not exist, then objective morality does not exist.
  2. Objective morality does exist.
  3. Therefore, God exists.
The debate:




The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Moral Oughtness



Opening Statement



I want to start off by thanking Maverick Christian (MaverickXtian) for hosting this discussion on his blog. I believe that ethics is, roughly, what Kant said it was- a system of rules that one follows from a sense of duty and the penalty for ethical transgression is self-contempt and inner abhorrence. If you ought to perform any particular action, then there is a more general reason why you ought to do it. Furthermore, if you accept any consideration as reason in one case, then you must also accept it as reason in other cases which are qualitatively similar. Therefore evaluative facts (i.e. moral facts) are truths of reason. Morality then, at a minimum, is about choosing particular actions for which we have the best reasons for choosing while giving equal weight to the desires of those affected by our choice. Rightness/wrongness and goodness/badness, then, are not to be understood in terms of God’s will or nature. Morality is a matter of reason and conscience.[3] In the following discussion that follows, I will outline an ethical non-naturalist framework, specifically, ethical intuitionism.

For purposes of this discussion, I will understand ‘objective moral oughtness’ as one of several evaluative and deontic properties entailed by evaluative facts e.g. ‘Action x is wrong’ or ‘One ought not perform action x.’ Throughout the discussion I will sometimes use the terms ‘evaluative facts’ and ‘objective moral oughtness’ interchangeably based on the context, because the truth of certain evaluative statements will entail objective moral oughtness, and the non-existence of objective, evaluative facts altogether would entail the non-existence of objective moral oughtness.

What is Ethics and Objectivity?



Ethics addresses evaluative questions (e.g. what actions ought not to be performed?). An evaluative question calls for an evaluative statement as an answer (e.g. one ought not to perform action x). This raises the metaethical questions relevant to our discussion:

Are some evaluative statements objectively true?

Do objective, evaluative facts exist?

An objective property of a thing is one that does not constitutively depend on observers’ attitudes or responses towards that thing. An evaluative statement is objectively true if its truth-value does not constitutively depend on observers’ attitudes or responses towards it.[1]a

What is Ethical Non-Naturalism?

[1]b

P1) Evaluative statements express propositions which are true or false.
 i.e. Ethical Non-Cognitivism is false.
P2) Evaluative statements are not always false.
 i.e. Ethical Nihilism is false.
P3) The truth of some evaluative statements do not constitutively depend on observers’ attitudes towards them.
 i.e. Ethical Subjectivism and Moral Relativism are false.
P4) Evaluative facts cannot be reduced to non-evaluative facts, nor can they be known solely by observation.
 i.e. Ethical Naturalism is false.
C1) Some evaluative statements are true. [From P1&P2]
C2) Some evaluative statements are objectively true. [From P3&C1]
C3) There are irreducible, objective, and evaluative facts which cannot be known solely by observation. [From P4&C2]
 i.e. Ethical Non-naturalism is true.


What is Ethical Intuitionism?

[1]c

“[By virtue of the kinds of beings we are] when our cognitive faculties are functioning properly we intuitively apprehend elementary moral truths, just as we intuit elementary truths of logic and arithmetic.”

Maverick Christian

Ethical intuitionism is a non-naturalist, meta-ethical theory where evaluative and deontic terms such as ‘good’ and ‘ought’ refer to objective, universal, and irreducible properties that we have non-inferential and a priori knowledge of via our rational intuitions.

Semantic Thesis: Evaluative predicates like ‘good’ and ‘ought’ function to attribute objective features to things regardless of whether they have those features or not.

Metaphysical Thesis: Some evaluative statements are true. If our evaluative judgments are true, then it is because our dispositions are in accord with the actual structure and weight of values in the case at hand. [4]a[5]a[6]a

Epistemic Thesis: We are justified in believing some evaluative statements on the basis of rational intuition. Our knowledge of evaluative facts is not wholly derived from sense perception/observation/empirical evidence nor are all evaluative facts derived from non-evaluative facts. At least some basic evaluative statements are self-evidently true.

Should we be direct realists regarding rational intuitions?



“The only real valuable thing is intuition.”
Albert Einstein

Some self-evidently true propositions (SEPs) containing evaluative terms:

SEP1: Pain is intrinsically bad.
SEP2: Pleasure is sometimes better than excruciating pain.
SEP3: If we ought not to perform action x, then we ought not to perform any action which is qualitatively indistinguishable from action x.
SEP4: No person is blameworthy for an action they did not perform.
SEP5: It is wrong in itself to take pleasure in torturing another sentient being.

The Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism[1]d

Other things being equal, it is reasonable to assume that things are the way that they appear. If it seems to one that p, then one has, at least, prima facie justification for believing that p. Our rational intuitions justify our believing SEP1-5 for the same reason our rational intuitions justify believing similar SEPs:

SEP6: Nothing is both red and green.
SEP7: If A is next to B, then B is next to A.
SEP8: Yellow is a color.
SEP9: Everything is identical with itself.
SEP10: 2+2=4

We are, similarly, direct realists regarding other kinds of experiences: [1]e

P1) S has a rational intuition that p is the case.
C1) Therefore S is, at least, prima facie justified for believing that p is the case.

By analogy:

P2) I have a sensory experience of object x.
C2) Therefore I am, at least, prima facie justified for believing that object x exists.

P3) I have a memory experience of event e.
C3) Therefore I am, at least, prima facie justified for believing that event e happened.


My account of a priori knowledge



My account of a priori knowledge has 4 aspects: [1]f

Aspect1: Universals exist necessarily. Evaluative terms like good, right, ought, better, etc. are universals. They are abstract things that two or more particular things have in common. For example, yellow is a universal. It is something that lemons, The Sun, and bananas have in common. Yellow is not a particular. You will not bump into yellowness at any particular time or in any particular place.
 
Aspect2: By virtue of having the capacity for concepts, we can grasp universals. Having the concept of yellow is to understand what yellow is. An adequate grasp of a universal is a concept that is:

1) Consistent i.e. does not entail a contradiction
2) Clear i.e. is not confused
3) Determinate i.e. not vague or unsettled
 
Aspect3: Having an adequate grasp of a universal allows us to see that it has certain properties and/or relationships to other universals that are adequately grasped. For example, if you know what pain is, then you can intuit that pain is intrinsically bad.
 
Aspect4: All a priori knowledge is, or is derived from, knowledge of the properties and/or relations of universals that have been adequately grasped.


Some crucial points regarding my views:



Point1: I take atheism to be the belief that God does not exist. This is because I believe that facts such as seemingly gratuitous suffering, non-resistant non-believers, and the improbability of a disembodied mind make God’s existence highly unlikely. These reasons are wholly independent of my intuitions of whether or not God exists.
 
Point2: MaverickXtian and I have affirmed the truth of some evaluative statements, and we agree that we know these truths via some form of intuition. I maintain that we know some basic evaluative facts by rational intuition. We are justified in our beliefs that rational intuitions are, on the whole, veridical for the same reason that we are justified in believing that our sense and memory experiences are, on the whole, veridical.
 
Point3: My beliefs in evaluative facts are epistemically prior to my beliefs regarding God’s existence. My beliefs in particular evaluative facts influence my belief in God’s existence, but my beliefs in God’s existence do not necessarily influence my beliefs in evaluative facts (though God’s existence would influence which particular evaluative statements would be true). My confidence in the truth of basic evaluative statements is higher than any confidence I have for the belief that God does not exist. For example, if it were discovered in perfect confidence that God does not exist, then such a discovery would have little to no impact on my beliefs in SEP1-10.
 
Point4: There are relevant differences between the concept of God and my conception of evaluative facts. Evaluative facts are abstract, universal, logically necessary, and known a priori i.e. they are truths of reason. God, conversely, is concrete, particular, logically contingent, and known a posteriori i.e. God’s existence is a truth about the world. There is no good reason to think that any atheist’s reasons for rejecting the existence of the latter would be similar to reasons for rejecting the former.
 
Point5: I am NOT claiming that we have a special (or ‘queer’) mental faculty dedicated solely for cognizing evaluative facts. Our rational intuitions are a function of reason. Rational intuition about evaluative facts differs from rational intuitions about mathematical facts in the same way that our perceptions of cars differ from perceptions of trees- that is, merely, in having different objects of perception. [1]g
 
Point6: I am NOT claiming to know the sufficient processes which account for the origins of our rational intuitions. Evolution likely contributed to shaping our rational intuitions, but that doesn’t commit me to the belief that sociobiological evolution is sufficient to explain the veridicality of such intuitions. Sociobiological evolutionary explanations no more cause me to doubt the veridicality of my basic moral intuitions then they cause me to doubt the veridicality of my basic mathematical intuitions. I think any person who believes that excruciating pain is intrinsically better than pleasure is just as mistaken as any person who believes that 7 is larger than 12. [4]b[5]b[6]b
 
Point7: I am NOT claiming that if atheism is true, then some form of reductionism or naturalism is probably true. I am a non-reductionist and a non-naturalist about reason, consciousness, intentionality, shapes, numbers, propositions, and objective value. [4]c[5]c[6]c
 
Point8: I am NOT claiming that rational intuitions are infallible or aren’t subject to revision after further reflection. I’m merely claiming that rational intuitions give us prima facie justification for our beliefs of certain evaluative facts.
 
Point9: I am NOT claiming that I believe God doesn’t exist, because He is invisible, non-physical, or not empirically detectable. These factors have almost no influence on my belief that God does not exist.[7]


MaverickXtian’s Main Thesis



“If atheism is true, then objective moral oughtness probably does not exist.”
Maverick Christian

Let A be: Atheism is true.
Let K be: The relevant background data.
Let M be: Objective moral oughtness exists.

The objective evidential relationship between A&K and M is claimed to be:

Pr(not-M|A&K) is high

MaverickXtian’s Main Argument



The Argument from The Unbiased Atheist

P1) If the Unbiased Atheist is justified in believing Pr(not-M|A&K) is high, then Pr(not-M|A&K) is high.

P2) The Unbiased Atheist is justified in believing Pr(not-M|A&K) is high.

C1) Therefore, Pr(not-M|A&K) is high.

P3) If Pr(not-M|A&K) is high, then "Given atheism, objective moral oughtness probably doesn't exist" is true.

C2) Therefore, given atheism, objective moral oughtness probably doesn't exist

The First Premise



“Let’s consider the point of view of someone I’ll call the Unbiased Atheist, a person who initially has no intuitions of [evaluative facts] existing or not existing, i.e. she isn’t biased by prior moral intuitions”
Maverick Christian

MaverickXtian needs to convince any particular atheist of the following:

TheFirstPremise: The vantage point of The Unbiased Atheist is a good one when assessing the objective evidential relationship between A&K and M.


I will argue that the vantage point of The Unbiased Atheist is not a good vantage point, and I’ll give 4 reasons for thinking that any particular atheist ought NOT to adopt it.

What good reason do we have to adopt the vantage point of The Unbiased Atheist?



MaverickXtian seems to think that a good vantage point for assessing an objective evidential relationship involving an abstract entity is one whose observer has no intuitions one way or another as to that entity’s existence. For example, MaverickXtian gives an analogy to quarks and how there is evidence independent of an observers intuitions as to whether or not quarks exist. However, objective moral oughtness is an entity that is known a priori while quarks are entities known a posteriori. This is important, because quarks will require observation of the world in order to assess its existence- but MaverickXtian and I have already agreed that basic evaluative truths CANNOT be known solely on the basis of observation. Stripped of the capacity for a priori knowledge, it’s no wonder that from this vantage point MaverickXtian concludes that The Unbiased Atheist is justified in believing that objective moral oughtness probably does not exist. However, if someone grants Point4, Point7, & Point9, then it should seem rather curious as to why such a vantage point is a good one.

4 reasons NOT to adopt the vantage point of The Unbiased Atheist:



Reason1: The vantage point of The Unbiased Atheist is incompatible with the Epistemic Thesis


Rational intuition is the mental faculty that I’m claiming accounts for our knowledge of basic evaluative facts. Any atheist committed to the Epistemic Thesis has good reason to be skeptical of taking a vantage point that is incompatible with it. Also see Point2.

Reason2: Rejecting our rational intuitions would imply a global skepticism.


Our rational intuitions are how we come to knowledge of a priori truths i.e. mathematical truths, logical truths, and other truths of reason. Evaluative truths are no different. Any reason to be skeptical of moral intuitions would be reason to be skeptical of all rational intuitions- including the truth of SEP6-10. This would imply a global skepticism that would leave us unable to make sense of the world- including the contents of this very blog. Also see Point2 & Point5.

Reason3: My beliefs regarding evaluative facts are epistemically prior to my belief that God does not exist.


The confidence in my beliefs of particular evaluative facts is not a function of whether or not God actually exists. To quote a contemporary, theologically inclined philosopher Robert Adams:

“Even if [theologically based] metaethics is the best theory of the nature of right and wrong, there are other theories which are more plausible than denying that cruelty is wrong. If God does not exist, my theory is false, but presumably the best alternative to it is true, and cruelty is still wrong.”[2]

Also see Point2, Point3, Point4, & Point9.

Reason4: My a priori knowledge of evaluative facts is not influenced by my a posteriori reasons for rejecting God’s existence.


This reason is sufficiently explained in Point1, Point2, Point3, Point4, & Point9.

The Second Premise



With reasons for rejecting The Unbiased Atheist in place, the best MaverickXtian will be able to argue for is the following:

TheSecondPremise: Any particular atheist would be justified in believing that rational intuitions are probably not veridical.


I will argue that none of the 6 evidences that MaverickXtian presents is cause for concern regarding our beliefs that our rational intuitions are veridical given atheism.

(1) If atheism is true, then there is zero empirical evidence for objective moral oughtness.

So what? I maintain that evaluative facts are known a priori. An atheist should not expect empirical evidence for the existence of objective moral oughtness on this view.

(2) If atheism is true, then which rational intuitions we’d get from sociobiological evolution are probably unguided and random.

See Point5, Point6, and Point7.

(3) If atheism is true, then objective moral oughtness is suspiciously queer.

If it were supposed that some basic evaluative facts (known a priori) can only exist if they are like other kinds of facts (those known a posteriori) then it is clear that there probably aren’t any. But I see no reason why an atheist should be committed to believing this- as discussed in Point4, Point5, & Point6. In fact, it seems like question-begging against ethical non-naturalism to suggest otherwise. Modal properties, propositions, numbers, shapes, and intentionality are all metaphysically queer in this sense as well, and I see no good reason to reject any of these properties given atheism.

(4) If atheism is true, then we know evolution occasionally gives false beliefs.

This isn’t a major concern. See Point6, Point7, & Point8.

(5) Belief in moral oughtness has evolutionary value whether true or not.

This isn’t a major concern. See Point6 & Point7.

(6) If atheism is true, then our best theory for why we believe in morality doesn’t require morality’s existence.

MaverickXtian merely asserts that sociobiological evolution is the BEST theory for why we believe in objective moral facts given atheism. I see this as merely an unjustified presupposition about atheism. See Point6 & Point7.

Conclusion



In the course of this discussion I’ve laid out a plausible (and atheist friendly) ethical non-naturalist moral framework, specifically, ethical intuitionism. In doing so, I affirmed the existence of evaluative facts (which entailed objective moral oughtness) without reference to any theologically-based premises. MaverickXtian’s burden was to defend the main thesis:

“If atheism is true, then objective moral oughtness probably does not exist.”

MaverickXtian attempted to convince us that The Unbiased Atheist is a good vantage point for assessing the objective evidential relationship of A&K and M. Then from this vantage point he tried to convince us that objective moral oughtness probably does not exist. Has he succeeded in this task? I don’t think that he has. We’ve seen 4 reasons NOT to adopt the vantage point of The Unbiased Atheist. Without this vantage point, the 6 evidences presented by MaverickXtian don’t seem to carry much force for convincing any particular atheist that their rational intuitions are probably not veridical. I often found it difficult to see how some of the evidences presented were even relevant to an atheist’s moral framework. This leaves the moral framework I laid out with no major concerns. Therefore I see no good reasons for any particular atheist to accept MaverickXtian’s main thesis.





[1](a, b, c, d, e, f, g) “Ethical Intuitionism” by Michael Huemer

[2] “Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief” by Robert Adams

[3] “The Elements of Moral Philosophy” 6th Edition, by James Rachels & Stuart Rachels

[4](a, b, c) “Mind and Cosmos” by Thomas Nagel

[5](a, b, c) “The View from Nowhere” by Thomas Nagel

[6](a, b, c) “The Last Word” by Thomas Nagel

[7] “Moral Realism: A Defense” by Russ Shafer-Landau

[8] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethical_intuitionism

Tuesday, October 13, 2015

Debate: Objective Morality Without God?

Home  >  Philosophy  >  Atheism/Theism

Preface



This is a debate between me and SeekSecularism over the truth of the first premise of the following moral argument:
  1. If God does not exist, then objective morality does not exist.
  2. Objective morality does exist.
  3. Therefore, God exists.
The debate so far:




Maverick Christian’s Opening Statement



The debate is about the first premise of the following moral argument (and I’ll argue that the first premise is true):
  1. If God doesn’t exist, then objective moral oughtness (OMO) doesn’t exist.
  2. Objective moral oughtness does exist.
  3. Conclusion: Therefore, God exists.

Moral Oughtness



Oughtness is an essential component of morality; e.g. an action is morally wrong for someone only if they ought not to do it, but it’s important to know the type of oughtness being used here since we use the word “ought” in a couple different ways. For that I’ll use stipulative definitions for these two terms: “descriptive ought” and “prescriptive ought.”

Let “descriptive ought” denote that type of ought where what it is can be expressed in purely descriptive language, e.g. when “If you want to live, you ought to breathe” just means something like, “As a matter of practical necessity, you need to breathe to live.” Descriptive language basically refers to language that doesn’t have terms like “ought” or “should” in it. Examples:
  • The atomic number of gold is 79.
  • Bob is in pain.
  • Bob needs an anesthetic to not feel pain.
  • The husband kept his promise to his wife.
Any “ought” that is no more than some purely descriptive state of affairs is a descriptive ought. One type of descriptive ought many of us are familiar with is the type found in hypothetical imperatives, and 18th century philosopher Immanuel Kant says the hypothetical imperative represents the “practical necessity of a possible action as means to something else.”[1] For example, a statement like “If you want to do well in school, you ought to study” meaning something like, “As a matter of practical necessity, you need to study to do well in school.”

Let the “prescriptive ought” be that type of ought that is prescriptive and isn’t a descriptive ought, e.g. “You should not torture infants just for fun.” The prescriptive ought is that sort of ought where what it is can’t be expressed in purely descriptive language, i.e. it’s that type of ought that isn’t the same thing as some purely descriptive state of affairs. Unless otherwise specified, when I use words like “ought” or “should” I’ll be using the prescriptive ought. The prescriptive ought is also the type of ought used in morality; morality tells us whether we really ought to do something, and not merely whether certain actions are a necessary means for some purely descriptive state of affairs. This is important because to get around the moral argument I’ve seen some atheists redefine morality so that it uses the descriptive ought.

General Approach



Note that the claim is not that OMO can’t exist without God, the claim is that OMO doesn’t exist without God. In this debate I’ll argue that if atheism is true then OMO doesn’t exist.

To illustrate my general approach, let’s consider how one can be justified in believing, “If it rained recently, then Sue’s car is wet” without knowing it with absolute certainty. Suppose I know Sue parked her car out in the open air two minutes ago, she has not left my side since then or given her car keys to anyone, and she’s the only one with the car keys. In this case (and given no further relevant information) I’m justified in believing “If it rained recently, then Sue’s car is wet.”

While it is possible that it rained recently and Sue’s car is not wet (e.g. maybe some weird person is randomly throwing tarps on people’s cars, including Sue’s car—though I have no reason to believe this happened) it is unlikely given the information that I have. Given that it rained recently, Sue’s car is probably wet—to the point where if I learned that it had rained recently, I would be justified in believing that Sue’s car is wet. Hence I am justified in believing, “If it rained recently, then Sue’s car is wet” even though I don’t know it with absolute certainty.

My approach to defending the first premise uses the same sort of reasoning: given atheism, OMO probably doesn’t exist—to the point where given atheism, one would be justified in believing OMO does not exist. If that’s true, we’d be justified in believing “If God does not exist, then OMO does not exist” even if we wouldn’t know it with absolute certainty.[2] I say “probably doesn’t exist” because I’m not claiming that on atheism we’d know for certain that OMO doesn’t exist, but I do think the probability is high enough such that on atheism we’d be justified in believing that OMO doesn’t exist.

To argue for my position, I’ll assume for sake of argument that atheism is true and then argue objective morality does not exist—thereby justifying “Given that atheism is true in the real world we are in, OMO probably does not exist.”

Overview



On a theistic worldview it makes perfect sense that there’d be some component of reality transcending our opinion that says people shouldn’t do certain things. Theism also (at least potentially) makes sense of moral knowledge, e.g. God designed us in such a way (by evolution or otherwise) such that when our cognitive faculties are functioning properly we intuitively apprehend elementary moral truths, just as we intuit elementary truths of logic and arithmetic.

But let’s suppose atheism is true.

On atheism OMO is rather strange; it’s invisible, nonphysical, and empirically undetectable. So why shouldn’t the consistent atheist reject the existence of this invisible nonphysical thing that cannot be empirically detected, if the atheist is to reject the existence of invisible nonphysical deities that have not been empirically detected? Given atheism, it seems more likely that people’s belief in moral oughtness is a delusion brought about by evolution to get us to behave in certain ways and help our species survive. Given atheism, OMO probably doesn’t exist.

Moral Oughtness is Empirically Undetectable



To explain what I mean by OMO being empirically undetectable, consider the following illustration. Imagine a moral nihilist (who disbelieves in moral oughtness) and a moral realist (who believes in moral oughtness) observe some jerk kicking a dog just for fun; the dog whimpers in pain and runs away. Both agree on all physiological and psychological facts, e.g. that the dog felt pain and suffered minor injury. The moral nihilist says, “I don’t think moral oughtness (like moral wrongness) is attached to that action.” The moral realist says, “I think moral oughtness (moral wrongness) is attached to that action.”

There is no empirical way to determine who is right here, because both views agree on all the same empirically observable facts. Not only do we have zero empirical evidence for the existence of OMO properties (like moral wrongness), we can’t have empirical evidence for OMO properties since they’re empirically undetectable.

One way to try to get around the problem is argue that “moral oughtness” is one and the same thing as a certain set of natural properties (properties of chemistry, physiology, psychology, etc.), since natural properties are empirically detectable. That won’t work with the type of moral oughtness we’re dealing with here though, since purely natural states of affairs can be expressed in purely descriptive language. Consider the following deductive argument:
  1. For any natural state of affairs S, what S is can be expressed in purely descriptive language (e.g. Bob being in pain).
  2. Moral oughtness is something where what it is cannot be expressed in purely descriptive language (by definition of “prescriptive ought”; recall that any “ought” that is no more than some purely descriptive state of affairs is a descriptive ought).
  3. Therefore, moral oughtness is not the same thing as some natural state of affairs.
The above argument can be proven with some symbolic logic, but the idea is fairly straightforward without it. OMO is nonphysical and non-natural. OMO is also so metaphysical that we can’t empirically detect it.

The Argument from the Unbiased Atheist



To help justify the claim, “Given atheism, OMO probably doesn’t exist” let’s consider the point of view of someone I’ll call the Unbiased Atheist, a person who initially has no intuitions of morality existing or not existing, i.e. she isn’t biased by prior moral intuitions. The Unbiased Atheist helps illustrate the vantage point of how likely OMO is given atheism and our background information (e.g. the fact that people have moral intuitions). Presumably, there are objective probability facts regarding the evidential relationship between data and belief, e.g. “On the basis of the scientific data, quarks probably exist” is objectively true, and this is the sort of probability I have in mind when I say, “Given atheism, OMO probably doesn’t exist” (viz. the objective evidential relationship between “atheism + background data” and “OMO exists”). With that in mind, consider what would be true if atheism is true.

(1) Zero empirical evidence for OMO properties. I’ve already argued for this point so I won’t repeat my justification here, but I will note that point (1) supports the idea that there is no evidence for OMO existing from the standpoint of the Unbiased Atheist.

(2) It’d be a remarkable coincidence if moral intuitions happened to line up with what these invisible, causally inert moral oughtness properties are really like. Supposedly there are certain actions that we morally ought and ought not to do, but how do we know these details of the OMO system? One straightforward idea is that we know of OMO properties through intuition, but this is problematic on atheism since which moral intuitions we’d get from sociobiological evolution is unguided and random—random in the sense that it could have been otherwise and there’s no external intelligence like God directing which intuitions we’d get. On naturalism we could have had very different moral codes, even more different from the variations we’ve seen in human history, because moral intuitions would likely track adaptive behavior (behavior conducive for survival and reproductive fitness) rather than truth. Evolution could even have evolved a species where adaptive behavior would be to kill one’s own sibling, and we know this because it’s already happened (the Nazca booby bird). All things considered, it would be a remarkable coincidence that our moral intuitions happen to coincide with what these invisible and causally inert moral properties are really like. Moreover, such reliance on remarkable coincidence suggests that we wouldn’t have real knowledge of objective moral truths; at best we’d have coincidentally true beliefs.

(3) OMO is suspiciously queer. To illustrate the general idea behind the Argument from Queerness, suppose someone claims there is an invisible unicorn floating above my head. This claim is possible, but not plausible. I would be justified in disbelieving in this unicorn. The unicorn is “queer” enough to be prima facia implausible, and we are prima facia justified in rejecting its existence; that is, in the absence of good reasons to believe it exists, we’re justified in rejecting its existence. To the Unbiased Atheist, OMO likewise seems “queer.” OMO is invisible, nonphysical, and empirically undetectable, yet exists somehow independently of our perception of it. Indeed, OMO is so metaphysical it seems we’d need something like supernatural clairvoyance to know it exists (naturally evolved intuition seems insufficient). From the Unbiased Atheist’s standpoint, she is prima facia justified in disbelieving OMO.

(4) Evolution occasionally gives false beliefs (e.g. gods). So there’s precedent for evolution giving humans false beliefs. And belief in gods potentially serves some evolutionary purpose: “Don’t do stuff that harms the group even if we’re not watching because the gods are watching and they’ll punish you for doing bad stuff.”

(5) Belief in moral oughtness has evolutionary value whether true or not. Suspiciously enough, belief in moral oughtness is kind of like the false belief in gods in potentially serving some evolutionary purpose: to get us to behave in the right ways. Belief in moral oughtness has evolutionary value whether true or not. This brings us to the next point:

(6) Our best theory for why we believe in morality doesn’t require morality’s existence. Our best theory (on atheism) for why we believe in moral oughtness is unguided sociobiological evolution giving us such moral intuition, and this atheistic theory for why we believe morality exists does not require morality’s existence. That’s unsurprising since OMO is causally inert; its presence or absence wouldn’t affect the evolutionary outcome at all. The fact that our best theory for why we believe in moral oughtness has no need for its existence strongly suggests that we don’t have rational grounds for believing in it.

Basically the idea is that the Unbiased Atheist (a) has no good reason to believe that people’s intuitions of moral oughtness existing are veridical; and (b) has at last prima facia grounds for thinking such moral intuitions are not veridical. I think the above six facts are enough to support (a) and (b) for the Unbiased Atheist. Summarizing, the following would be true if atheism is true:
  1. Zero empirical evidence for objective moral properties.  This supports my view that on atheism we don’t have rational grounds for believing moral objectivism.
  2. It’d be a remarkable coincidence if moral intuitions happened to line up with what these invisible, causally inert moral properties are really like. Such reliance on remarkable coincidence suggests that we wouldn’t have real knowledge of objective moral truths; at best we’d have coincidentally true beliefs.
  3. OMO properties are suspiciously queer, akin to invisible and nonphysical gods.  Thus there’s at least prima facia justification for disbelieving OMO’s existence.
  4. Evolution occasionally gives false beliefs (e.g. gods).  So there’s precedent for evolution giving humans false beliefs.  And belief in gods potentially serves some evolutionary purpose: “Don’t do stuff that harms the group even if we’re not watching because the gods are watching and they’ll punish you for doing bad stuff.”
  5. Moral oughtness beliefs have evolutionary value whether true or not.  Suspiciously enough, moral oughtness beliefs are kind of like the false belief in gods in potentially serving some evolutionary purpose: to get us to behave in the right ways.  Moral oughtness beliefs have evolutionary value whether true or not.
  6. Our best theory for why we believe in moral oughtness doesn’t require its existence.  This strongly suggests we don’t have rational grounds for believing in moral oughtness.  And we don’t need to posit something so extravagant as these invisible and highly metaphysical properties to explain moral beliefs; we can just say it’s a trick of evolution to get us to behave in certain ways.
Lines (1) though (6) above serve as the premises for a sort of inductive argument for the conclusion, “The reasonable conclusion for our Unbiased Atheist is that like intuitions of gods existing, moral intuitions are probably delusory and not veridical.” I’m not saying the Unbiased Atheist would know for certain that OMO doesn’t exist, but given the above six facts I think she’d be justified in believing it doesn’t exist.

We can make a deductive argument from the Unbiased Atheist that goes like this:
  1. If the Unbiased Atheist would be justified in believing moral intuitions are not veridical, then given atheism moral intuitions are probably not veridical.
  2. The Unbiased Atheist would be justified in believing moral intuitions are not veridical.
  3. Therefore, given atheism moral intuitions are probably not veridical.
The first premise is true because the Unbiased Atheist is rationally considering all the evidence including the existence of human moral intuition; her vantage point represents the objective evidential relationship between “atheism + background data” and “moral intuitions are veridical.” If from her vantage point moral intuitions are probably not veridical, then (from an objective standpoint) given atheism moral intuitions are probably not veridical.

The second premise is justifiably true due to the reasons I’ve already mentioned (no rational grounds for the Unbiased Atheist to believe OMO, OMO’s queerness gives prima facia grounds for rejecting its existence, etc.).

Conclusion



With the background data we have, OMO probably doesn’t exist if atheism is true. On atheism, the Argument from Queerness provides prima facia grounds for disbelieving OMO, and the Argument from the Unbiased Atheist suggests that people’s intuitions of moral oughtness existing are probably not veridical (both premises appear true; my challenge to my opponent: which premise is false and why?). The Unbiased Atheist provides a vantage point to view the objective evidential relationship between “atheism + background data” and “OMO exists,” helping to show why “OMO exists” is probably false on atheism given the background data we have.

If it’s true OMO probably doesn’t exist if atheism is true to the point where given atheism we’d be justified in disbelieving OMO, then we’re justified in believing “If God does not exist, then OMO doesn’t exist.”[2]

A challenge to my opponent: why on atheism should we believe in OMO? The only thing I can think of is moral intuition (it is why I currently believe in OMO), but the Argument from the Unbiased Atheist seems to show that “atheism + background data” strongly suggests that such moral intuition is probably not veridical, such that if I were an atheist I would disbelieve OMO. Moreover on atheism the objective evidence seems awfully one-sided; it seems the Unbiased Atheist has reason to disbelieve in OMO (e.g. Argument from Queerness) and has no evidence for OMO existing. Given premises (1) through (6) of my inductive argument (the one arguing that the reasonable conclusion for the Unbiased Atheist is that people’s intuitions of moral oughtness existing are probably not veridical), why on atheism should we believe that OMO exists and that people’s intuitions of it existing are any less delusory than people’s intuitions of gods?



[1] Section 2 of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (a.k.a. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals) in Thomas Kingsmill Abbott’s translation.

[2] There’s a mathematical proof for the idea that “Given A, probably C” entails “Probably, if A then C.” Thus, “Given atheism, OMO probably does not exist” entails “Probably, If atheism is true then OMO does not exist.”

Debate Preface

My first live oral debate (which can be seen on YouTube) was about the first premise of this moral argument:
  1. If God does not exist, then objective morality does not exist.
  2. Objective morality does exist.
  3. Conclusion: therefore God exists.
That debate was kind of flop—I won, but I won too easily since my opponent basically agreed with me that the first premise is true (he initially denied the first premise only by redefining morality; when using “morality” in it is normal sense, he agreed that this sort of morality probably doesn’t exist if atheism is true).

Recently I was invited to do a debate on the first premise with a particular individual (leaving the platform to us debaters) and I volunteered my blog. You can see my opening statement here.