Anything that Begins to Exist Has a Cause (p. 4)

Anything that Begins to Exist Has a Cause

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Conclusion

The first premise of the KCA is “anything that begins to exist has a cause” where “cause” is understood to include both material and efficient causes, making the premise tantamount to “it is not the case that something begins to exist with no efficient cause and no material cause.” Something coming into being with no efficient cause and no material cause would constitute something coming into being from nothing and thus a violation of ex nihilo nihil fit (from nothing, nothing comes). Three reasons to believe ex nihilo nihil fit:

1. Something coming into being from nothing is literally worse than magic. If the intelligent atheist has good reason to accept the implausibility of magicians who can pop things into being by waving their magic wands, she has even better reason to accept the implausibility of things popping into being uncaused out of nothing.
2. If ex nihilo nihil fit can be violated, it becomes inexplicable why anything and everything doesn’t pop into being out of nothing. The ex nihilo nihil fit principle is the best and only explanation for why not everything and anything pops into being uncaused (i.e. no efficient cause and no material cause).
3. Common experience and scientific evidence confirm ex nihilo nihil fit. Related to the second reason, the fact that we don’t see anything and everything popping into being from nothing gives us substantial evidence for the “anything that begins to exist has a cause” premise. Science (e.g. the conservation of electric charge) and common experience provide significant support.

The first reason is akin to the intuitive plausibility ex nihilo nihil fit has right off the bat. Consider the robots on Pluto scenario, where a person says, “These robots might have popped into being uncaused out of nothing.” Clearly such an explanation isn’t a viable option, and even atheists have a natural skepticism towards violations of ex nihilo nihil fit, at least when such violations are not convenient for atheism.

When considering the rebuttals to the three objections I discussed, it becomes increasingly evident that the rational support for ex nihilo nihil fit is extremely strong, unsurpassed by even the best confirmed physical laws that astrophysics relies on. One reason is that if we accept that ex nihilo nihil fit can be violated at all, we cannot justifiably assume the uniformity of nature with respect to things coming into being from nothing only infrequently, because qua nothing there isn’t anything to constrain the frequency of how often such things would happen, and so there is no good justification for the belief that it would continue to occur only infrequently. The upshot would be we would have to abandon our natural skepticism to “things coming into being from nothing” claims, and this seems unreasonable. Ex nihilo nihil fit should, all things considered, be accepted with a great deal of confidence.

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Anything that Begins to Exist Has a Cause (p. 3)

Anything that Begins to Exist Has a Cause

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Objection: Violations of ex nihilo nihil fit occur far away

Objection:

The second reason offered for the ex nihilo nihil fit principle is that if the principle could be violated it becomes inexplicable why anything and everything doesn’t pop into being uncaused out of nothing. But how do we know that doesn’t happen? True, we haven’t seen it, but that’s an awfully small sample space given how huge the universe is. Perhaps anything and everything does pop into being uncaused out of nothing, and it’s just that this happens somewhere out there in the vast cosmos beyond our own observable sphere.

Rebuttal:

One wonders if critics would give the same skepticism to the physical laws that astrophysics relies on as they do to ex nihilo nihil fit, since astrophysics also assumes that the laws that hold in our own tiny observable sphere also apply far out in space. Should we reject this assumption that astrophysics relies on, and thereby also reject the claims of astrophysics? I think not. Science in general assumes something called the uniformity of nature (nature operating uniformly, in some relevant sense, in the past and in the future throughout various locations; e.g. the physical laws of last year on earth will apply next week on Pluto), and this axiom is particularly useful in astrophysics. If the critic doesn’t apply the same level of skepticism for the physical laws that astrophysics relies on and offers no justification for the double standard, I think we have a case for special pleading here because there doesn’t seem to be a relevant difference between the two.

One reason there doesn’t appear to be a relevant difference is this: anything and everything popping into being uncaused out of nothing somewhere out there in the cosmos flagrantly violates physical laws, in particular the conservation of mass-energy. Should astrophysics embrace the uniformity of nature only when it isn’t inconvenient for atheism? That seems pretty extreme.

On top of that, we can modify the claim and note that if ex nihilo nihil fit can be violated it becomes inexplicable why anything and everything doesn’t pop into being uncaused out of nothing within our own observable sphere. After all, why would nothingness have a proclivity to have some things pop into being from it only when we’re not looking? What makes nothingness so discriminatory? Again, nothingness has no properties, so to ascribe such a proclivity to nothingness would be to make a category error, like ascribing weight to the number seven. And again, “inexplicable” means “there can’t be an explanation.” So it’s not just that ex nihilo nihil fit is the best explanation for why anything and everything doesn’t pop into being uncaused out of nothing within our own observable sphere, it’s the only explanation. All things considered then, saying “Maybe anything and everything pops into being somewhere out there in vast unobservable space” not only abandons the laws of physics, it does little more than move the problem elsewhere. Thus we’re better off accepting the laws of physics and accepting that it is not the case that anything and everything pops into being uncaused out of nothing, but if one insists on abandoning such laws of physics, we still have serious problems with abandoning ex nihilo nihil fit, albeit problems moved into another room.

Objection: Violations of ex nihilo nihil fit happen rarely

Objection:

Perhaps the reason why we don’t see violations of ex nihilo nihil fit is that they happen too rarely to be observed. This, it still might be possible that (for example) the universe sprang into being uncaused out of nothing.

Rebuttal:

It’s notable that this sort of response wouldn’t be accepted in cases where atheism isn’t threatened. Think back to the case of the police officer finding a suspiciously large amount of money in my trunk. If I say, “This money popped into being uncaused out of nothing” not even an atheist police officer would accept this is a plausible theory. If the police officer noted that scientific evidence and common experience suggests that this sort of thing just doesn’t happen, the response “Well, maybe it does happen and it happens only rarely” would do little to convince any reasonable person that the money popping into being uncaused is a viable possibility. Why then should we make the universe an exception to this sort of thing? I thus think an atheist who thinks “the universe came into being uncaused out nothing” is a viable option might be using double standards.

Regardless, there are other points to consider. First, it becomes inexplicable why violations of ex nihilo nihil fit would happen only rarely. Remember, nothingness has no properties, so it wouldn’t make any sense to ascribe a “things always come into being only rarely from it” property to it.

Second (and related to the first reason), we couldn’t rely on the uniformity of nature to think that this pattern of “it happens only rarely” will continue to work in the near future for our own observable realm. There can’t be anything to constrain how often things come into being from nothing, because (qua nothing) there isn’t really anything to constrain. We also cannot ascribe to nothingness a lawlike property to (for example) ensure have things pop into being from it only once every x number of years such that it happens too infrequently for us to notice, because nothingness has no properties (since qua nothing, there isn’t really anything to have properties).

Why is that a big deal? Because the typical atheist will naturally have a great deal of skepticism about something coming into being from nothing (at least when it’s not inconvenient for atheism). To illustrate, imagine you’re an atheist who rejects the uniformity of nature with respect to things coming into being from nothing. If I say that a rock I am holding popped into being uncaused out of nothing, you could not justifiably dismiss it merely because we haven’t seen such things happen in the past if you grant that ex nihilo nihil fit could be violated, because there cannot even in principle be any metaphysical or physical law (or anything else) restricting the frequency of things popping into being uncaused out of nothing. So even if you believe that it’s currently rare for things to come into being from nothing, you would have no basis for thinking that would hold tomorrow or next week in your neighborhood, since the uniformity of nature wouldn’t apply to how often things come into being nothing. You could then be reasonably worried that a large building might pop into being from nothing above your home and crush it, but clearly such a worry seems unreasonable.

To illustrate this one step further, suppose astronauts landed on Pluto and found robots there. One astronaut, desperate to avoid believing in a nonhuman creator, says, “Maybe these robots popped into being uncaused out of nothing shortly before we got here.” If others told him we’ve never seen such a thing happening, his reply that “Maybe things pop into being only rarely, at least until recently” or “Maybe it happens only when we’re not looking” would seem terribly ad hoc, in addition to all the other problems I’ve mentioned (the three reasons to believe ex nihilo nihil fit I gave earlier). But more to the point, you would greet the astronaut’s claim with severe skepticism, but unless you held to the uniformity of nature (as regarding the impossibility or rarity of things popping into being from nothing) you could not possibly justify your skepticism, and if ex nihilo nihil fit violations can happen at all, you would have no basis for thinking that the uniformity of nature regarding the rarity of things coming into being from nothing would continue to apply.

We thus have two options: (1) abandon seemingly justifiable skepticism against claims like the astronaut saying the robots popped into being from nothing; (2) accept ex nihilo nihil fit.

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Anything that Begins to Exist Has a Cause (p. 2)

Anything that Begins to Exist Has a Cause

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Objection: Physics gives examples of things coming into being from nothing.

Objection:

Science has observed that fluctuations in the quantum vacuum bring about virtual particles, and since the particles come from a vacuum we have something coming into being from nothing. Also, physics tells us that if we have two physically identical uranium-238 atoms, it’s possible for one to emit an alpha particle (two protons and two neutrons) while the other one doesn’t, with no causal explanation for the different outcome. Thus, the alpha particle emission is an uncaused event.

Rebuttal:

Alleged examples of things coming into being come in at least two basic types. The first instance (as in the particles emerging from the quantum vacuum) uses the term “nothing” to refer to the quantum vacuum or some other sort of physical reality, which isn’t literal nothingness. Nothing by definition isn’t anything. So here’s a test: if the “nothing” you see someone describe has physical properties, then it’s not literal nothingness. Something coming into being from literally nothing means it doesn’t come into being from anything—not physical laws, not quantum vacuums, not anything. The phrase “X comes from nothing” doesn’t mean X comes into being from something and that something is called “nothing.” Rather “X comes into being from nothing” means X comes into being but there isn’t anything that X comes into being from, i.e. X comes into being with no efficient cause and no material cause. That means X doesn’t come from a quantum vacuum, the laws of physics, or anything else.

The idea bears repeating: if they’re talking about the physics of the alleged nothingness, then it’s not literal nothingness. Literal nothingness (nonbeing) has literally nothing—no space, no time, no matter, no energy, no physical stuff at all—and thus no physics. One might as well talk about the physics of the number six.

Another basic type of “scientific” response is to conflate causality with determinism, or at least to conflate a cause of an event (as in outcome 1 coming about versus outcome 2) with a cause of the existence of a thing. The difference is important but subtle. To illustrate, consider the case of two physically identical uranium-238 atoms A and B, where atom A emits an alpha particle and atom B does not. It may indeed be true that identical physical conditions can produce different outcomes, and while this would rule out the uranium atom deterministically bringing about the alpha particle, it doesn’t rule out indeterministic causation. So let’s consider the theory that the uranium atom indeterministically causes the existence of the alpha particle. This theory would entail that the existence of the alpha particle has a causal explanation, but this theory would also imply that there is no causal explanation for why uranium atom A emitted an alpha particle and physically identical uranium atom B did not, i.e. there wouldn’t be a causal explanation for the different outcomes between the two physically identical atoms (though there would be a “random chance” explanation for the difference), even though the existence of the alpha particle would have a causal explanation. The “anything that begins to exist has a cause” claim says that every thing that begins to exist has a cause, but allows for the possibility of uncaused events (e.g. outcome 1 coming about versus outcome 2).

It’s also worth noting that if nothing else, the alpha particle has a material cause: the two protons and two neutrons come from the uraniuim-238 atom itself, thereby transmuting the uranium-238 atom into an atom with two fewer protons and two fewer neutrons. One could say that the alpha particle has a material cause but no efficient cause, but then if the uranium-238 atom with its properties does not indeterministically cause the existence of the alpha particle, why does the uranium isotope have a highly predictable half-life? And why is it that the uranium isotope consistently (albeit randomly) emits alpha particles whereas carbon-twelve atoms do not? By far the best explanation is that the properties of the uranium atoms indeterministically bring about alpha particles.

But as I mentioned ealier, even if the alpha particle didn’t have an efficient cause, it remains true that the alpha particle has a material cause. So even if the event is uncaused (no causal explanation for the different outcomes), the thing (the alpha particle) still has a cause for its existence—a material cause if nothing else.

Objection: Ex nihilo nihil fit applies only within our universe

Objection:

The theist commits a fallacy of composition, thinking that what is true of its parts (stuff within the universe) is also true of its whole (the universe itself). Specifically, the theist reasons “Ex nihilo nihil fit is true within the universe, therefore it also true of the universe.” But that’s fallacious. Maybe stuff within the universe cannot pop into being from nothing, but that doesn’t mean the universe itself can’t pop into being from nothing.

Rebuttal:

First, the fallacy of composition depends on the circumstances, viz. whether the composition would create a relevant difference. If for example a wall is made entirely of large red tiles, we can justifiably say that the wall is itself red. Second, the fallacy of composition doesn’t really apply here. While one could make an argument like, “Ex nihilo nihil fit is true within the universe, therefore it’s true of the universe” that argument wasn’t made in any of the three reasons I gave for the “anything that begins to exist has a cause” claim. That said, scientific and empirical confirmation do constitute legitimate evidence for ex nihilo nihil fit (ENNF). But couldn’t one argue that scientific confirmation only establishes ENNF holding true for within our universe?

One thing to understand is that ENNF is not being offered as a mere physical law but rather a metaphysical principle that applies to anything in reality. One view on ENNF is that, just as the number six lacks the potential for things to come out of being from it, nothingness qua nothing likewise lacks the potential for things to come out of being from it such that ENNF is a metaphysically necessary principle that applies not just in our universe but everywhere. But another idea is that ENNF holds merely as a physical law, a principle that holds in the universe but possibly not outside of it. How to explain why ENNF holds as a physical law but not a metaphysical one? How to explain why ENNF holds within the universe but not outside of it? Two types of factors present themselves:

1. Intrinsic. In general, one way for a constraint to occur in different circumstances is that the properties of the thing in question (e.g. the properties of the electron) bring the different constraint about. This doesn’t hold true for nothingness, since qua nothing there isn’t anything to have properties.
2. Extrinsic. Another way is for some external “force” to place constraints on the thing in question. This doesn’t work for nothingness though, since qua nothing there isn’t really anything to constrain. So neither the universe nor anything in it can place a constraint on nothingness where there would otherwise be none, since qua nothing there isn’t anything to constrain.

If violations of ENNF are possible outside the universe then they’re possible within the universe, because there isn’t anything about the universe (or nothingness) that could make a difference with respect to the possibility of things coming into being from nothing; the universe can’t place a constraint on nothingness where there would otherwise be none, and nothingness can’t have any properties that would give it a predisposition to have things come into being from it in certain conditions but not others.

If ENNF can be violated, it really does become inexplicable why not anything and everything pops into being uncaused out of nothing all the time. The proponent of ENNF violations would have to say something like, “Well, things could pop into being from nothing all around us, but this just doesn’t happen and there’s no explanation for why it doesn’t happen.” In light of scientific conservation laws this doesn’t appear plausible. It seems that physical laws describe a genuine necessity, that e.g. fifty kilograms of electrons can’t just pop into being uncaused out of nothing before one’s eyes. So scientific confirmation is important not only for establishing that ENNF holds true in our universe but also for establishing that ENNF applies everywhere. Consider the following argument:

1. If violations of ENNF are possible outside the universe, then they’re possible within the universe.
2. Violations of ENNF are not possible within the universe (as confirmed by science).
3. Conclusion: therefore, violations of ENNF are not possible outside the universe.

Justification for premise (1): as mentioned earlier, there isn’t anything about the universe (or nothingness) that could make a difference with respect to the possibility of things coming into being from nothing; the universe can’t place a constraint on nothingness where there would otherwise be none, and nothingness can’t have any properties that would give it a predisposition to have things come into being from it in certain conditions but not others. Neither intrinsic nor extrinsic factors could make a difference for whether ENNF violations can occur outside versus inside the universe.

Justification for premise (2): a series of reasons present a strong cumulative case for thinking ENNF violations cannot occur within the universe. First, violations of ENNF are literally worse than magic, giving ENNF some plausibility for our universe. Second, ENNF is the best and only explanation for why anything and everything doesn’t pop into being uncaused out of nothing, as mentioned earlier. Third, science confirms ENNF; it seems that physical laws describe a genuine necessity, that e.g. fifty kilograms of electrons can’t just pop into being uncaused out of nothing before one’s eyes.

Premises (1) and (2) are both justifiably true, which means the conclusion is true also. And of course, if ENNF applies both inside and outside the universe, it applies everywhere.

Another problem with certain conditions making it more likely (as from impossible to possible) for a thing to come into being “uncaused” is this. If conditions C make it more probable for thing x to come into being, and x comes into being when no factors apart from C brought x into being, then C by definition causes x to come into being. This will of course depend on one’s definition of “cause” but it works with the conception that I (and I think many others) use, because by conditions C causing x I mean that C (deterministically or indeterministically) brings about x such that if C is the only thing making it more likely for x to come into being, then C causes x’s existence should x come into being. To illustrate, if the rays from a fired ray gun is the only thing that increases the probability of a mouse coming into being (say, from 0% to 30%), then the ray gun causes the mouse to come into being should the mouse come into being.[1] So external conditions making “X comes into being uncaused” more likely does not seem to work if one is looking for a bona fide uncaused creation event. If the ex nihilo nihil fit principle is to apply in some conditions, it applies in all conditions, because one cannot sensibly say it applies only to some conditions and that other conditions make it more likely for things to come into being uncaused. Thus the ex nihilo nihil fit principle holds either everywhere (i.e. in all conditions) or nowhere.

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[1] Note that I’m defining “cause” in such a way that includes “conditions C indeterministically bringing something into existence.” On the other hand, if one’s definition of “cause” is “that which deterministically brings about something” then an indeterministic cause is (on this definition) logically impossible, and I’ve seen some define “cause” in such a way to include only those things that deterministically brings about something, but I don’t think this matches what people normally mean by “cause.” Suppose for example a special kind of rock thrown against a glass window has a truly random 50% chance of breaking the glass, and that this rock breaks the glass. Since the rock breaks the glass, the rock brings about the breaking of the glass, and so the rock causes the glass to break in the ordinary conception of “cause” even though it would be indeterministic causation.

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