The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument for God (Page 5)

Home  >  Philosophy  >  Atheism/Theism

The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument for God

< Prev   |   1   |   2   |   3   |   4   |   5   |   Next >

LCA 2

Yet another argument:

1. There is an explanation for why there is something rather than nothing.
2. If there is an explanation for why something exists, that explanation is God.
3. Therefore, the explanation for why something exists rather than nothing is God (from 1 and 2).

One could reject premise 2 by being a Platonist, but otherwise we can accept premise 2 for the same sort of reason as we can affirm “If the contingent universe does have an external cause for its existence, that cause is God” if we accept that there are no necessarily existing things with the possible exception of God (apart from God and maybe abstract objects, there doesn’t appear to be any other plausible candidates for necessarily existing things). If God exists he exists necessarily, and if God exists something exists. This would explain why something exists rather than nothing. God also explains why the contingent universe exists and why the physical universe exists. Once again, if the atheist insists that God can’t be used an explanation, we can tone it down and just say that an eternal, transcendent, metaphysically necessary personal entity is the best explanation for why there is something rather than nothing.

One advantage this version of the LCA has is “Why is there something rather than nothing?” more perspicuously requires an explanation. By my lights, the best atheist response to “Why is there something rather than nothing?” (since I wouldn’t be a Platonist if I were an atheist) is “it just exists inexplicably.” All else held constant though, we’re better off with a worldview that gives us an explanation for why there is something rather than nothing as opposed to a worldview that gives us no such explanation.

Conclusion

I’ll summarize and highlight some key points for the series.

Explaining Why the Physical Universe Exists

The first version of the Leibnizian cosmological argument (LCA), what I labeled LCA 1A, goes like this, where premise 1 is a version of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR).

1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or an external cause.
2. The universe exists.
3. If the universe does have an explanation for its existence, that explanation is God.
4. Therefore, the universe has an explanation of its existence (from 1 and 2).
5. Therefore, the explanation for the existence of the universe is God (from 3 and 4).

Premise 3 is plausibly true as a result of “If God does not exist, then the universe has no explanation of its existence” being likely true, since a transcendent personal cause seems to be the only viable explanation for the universe’s existence. With a physical external cause of the universe’s existence being impossible, the universe’s external cause would have to be ethereal and no less strange than God creating the universe. By far the best option for the atheist is to say that universe exists eternally, inexplicably, with no external cause of its existence. “If God does not exist, then the universe has no explanation of its existence” is much more plausible than its denial. But “If God does not exist, then the universe has no explanation of its existence” is logically equivalent to “If the universe has an explanation of its existence, then God exists,” which is almost synonymous with premise 3. Still, if the atheist insists that God cannot be legitimately used as an explanation (for whatever reason) in spite of the strong justification for premise 3, there is the following toned down argument that I labeled LCA 1B:

1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or an external cause.
2. The universe exists.
3. If the universe does have an explanation for its existence, that explanation is a transcendent personal cause.
4. Therefore, the universe has an explanation of its existence (from 1 and 2).
5. Therefore, the explanation for the existence of the universe is a transcendent personal cause (from 3 and 4).

The physical universe having a transcendent personal cause still makes atheism less plausible.

By my lights the weakest part of the LCA is the PSR, such that it is the premise I would reject if I were an atheist. The argument crucially hinges on the universe having an explanation of its existence, but there is good reason to accept that there is an explanation for the existence of the universe. The justification offered:

1. The translucent ball in the woods illustration. Increasing the size of the ball doesn’t remove the need for an explanation. This helps to illustrate that it is rational to accept that there are explanations for the existence of things, at least when we have no reason to think that an explanation doesn’t exist (if most of the universe were merely a translucent ball, it seems we’d still need an explanation for the ball’s existence).
2. The nature of rational inquiry. It’s the nature of rational inquiry to look for explanations for why things exist. We seek explanations for the existence of humans, of planets, of stars, and of galaxies. Avoiding all that and saying, “It all just exists inexplicably” would cripple science. And if we are rational to accept that there are explanations for the existence of planets, stars, and galaxies, why not also accept that there is an explanation for the existence of the physical universe? Simply not liking the only viable explanation for the universe’s existence isn’t a good enough reason. The rational thing to do is to accept that there are explanations for the existence of things if we don’t have good reason to believe otherwise, especially if we have an explanation readily available and no evidence for the explanation being false (e.g. believing that the cosmic microwave background radiation just exists inexplicably is less rational than accepting that the big bang theory explains it).
3. If the shoe were on the other foot… If we had an explanation for the existence of the physical universe that devastated theism (imagine that the best explanation for the physical universe’s existence required that God does not exist) and it was the only viable explanation, and a theist gave a “Maybe there’s just no explanation” response, atheists would argue that the response is just an attempt to avoid a serious intellectual problem for theism, and that the rational thing to do is to accept that there is a an explanation for the existence of the physical universe if we don’t have good reason to believe otherwise. And such atheists would be right! But if that is true, rationality dictates that we be consistent and acknowledge that the best (and apparently the only viable) explanation for the existence of the universe being a transcendent personal cause is a serious intellectual problem for atheism, and that we should accept that there is an explanation for the existence of the universe if we don’t have good reason to think otherwise.

One could say that the universe is eternal, but it’s clear that something being eternal doesn’t necessarily remove the need for an explanation. For example, we can conceive of a three-dimensional hologram projection that exists eternally and is also eternally sustained by a hologram projector. With that in mind, if there is some thing X that meets the following conditions...

1. X is eternal but contingent (it could have failed to exist).
2. There is an explanation for why X exists.
3. It is the only explanation of X’s existence that is a live option.
4. There is no reason to believe that this explanation for X’s existence is false.

…then it seems we should accept that explanation for X if we have no good reason not to. It’s also good to remember the three reasons above for believing that the rational thing to do is to accept that the universe has an explanation of its existence if we have no good reason to think otherwise. In the “shoe on the other foot” case for example, suppose we had an explanation for the physical universe’s existence that was devastating to theism and the explanation met conditions 1 through 4 (it explains why the universe exists, there is no other viable explanation etc.). Couldn’t the atheist justifiably accept this explanation as evidence against theism? If so, then we should recognize that the only viable explanation for the physical universe’s existence being a transcendent personal cause poses a serious intellectual problem for atheism.

Even if the theist grants that maybe not every eternal contingent thing has an explanation of its existence, all things considered it seems the theist is on good grounds to say that at least the universe has an explanation of its existence, in which case the theist can use this version of the LCA that I labelled LCA 1C:

1. If the universe exists it has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or an external cause.
2. The universe exists.
3. If the universe does have an explanation for its existence, that explanation is a transcendent personal cause.
4. Therefore, the universe has an explanation of its existence (from 1 and 2).
5. Therefore, the explanation for the existence of the universe is a transcendent personal cause (from 3 and 4).

This still yields a conclusion that, if true, makes atheism considerably less plausible.

The Argument from Contingency

One form of an argument from contingency (what was called LCA 3) goes as follows:

1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or an external cause.
2. The contingent universe exists.
3. If the contingent universe has an explanation for its existence, that explanation is God.
4. Therefore, the contingent universe has an explanation of its existence (from 1 and 2).
5. Therefore, the external cause of the contingent universe is God (from 3 and 4).

To summarize the justification for premise 3: the contingent universe does not exist necessarily, i.e. there is a possible world where no contingent thing exists. Thus the contingent universe does not exist by the necessity of its own nature and (due to premise 1) has an external cause. All of physical reality is contingent, and since the physical universe is a subset of the contingent universe, the external cause of the contingent universe would have to be nonphysical. We can then employ the same sort of reasoning in LCA 1 to conclude that the nonphysical external cause of the contingent universe is a transcendent personal cause. Since we’re looking for an external cause of the contingent universe (i.e. the totality of contingent things), that which is the external cause of the contingent universe cannot itself be contingent but must be metaphysically necessary. So the transcendent personal entity that is the external cause of the contingent universe is metaphysically necessary. What is metaphysically necessary is also eternal, since at no times and in no circumstances can metaphysically necessary entities fail to exist. So the transcendent, metaphysically necessary, personal entity that is the external cause of the contingent universe is also eternal. We thus end up with an eternal, transcendent, metaphysically necessary, personal entity that is the external cause of the contingent universe if the contingent universe has an explanation of its existence. Consequently, “If God does not exist, then the contingent universe has no explanation of its existence” is very likely true, and since “If God does not exist, then the contingent universe has no explanation of its existence” is logically equivalent to “If the contingent universe has an explanation of its existence, then God exists” we have strong reason to believe that premise 3 is true.

As before, if the atheist for whatever reason insists that God can’t be used as an explanation, then we can construct a tone downed version of the argument.

1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or an external cause.
2. The contingent universe exists.
3. If the contingent universe has an explanation for its existence, that explanation is is an eternal, transcendent, metaphysically necessary, personal entity.
4. Therefore, the contingent universe has an explanation of its existence (from 1 and 2).
5. Therefore, the explanation of the contingent universe is an eternal, transcendent, metaphysically necessary, personal entity (from 3 and 4).

Arguably, any atheism that accepts the existence of an eternal, transcendent, metaphysically necessary, personal entity that is the cause of the universe would not be worthy of the name “atheism.”

The question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” is one of the most fundamental questions in philosophy. The atheist can say, “Platonism is true and abstract objects exist necessarily, and if abstract objects exist something exists.” But if the atheist is not a Platonist, it seems that atheism cannot offer a viable explanation for why there is something rather than nothing whereas theism does. Moreover, even if we were to grant Platonism, there is a “Why does the contingent universe exist?” question that Platonism cannot answer (since abstract objects cannot cause anything) and we end up with an eternal, transcendent, metaphysically necessary, personal entity causing the universe. This is enough to make atheism less plausible.

While one could believe that the transcendent personal cause for the physical universe is different from the transcendent personal cause of the contingent universe, Ockham’s razor suggests we not multiply explanatory entities unnecessarily and it is simpler to posit the same transcendent personal cause for both the physical and contingent universe (I suspect there is extremely large overlap between the physical universe and the contingent universe anyway). Even apart from that, if we justifiably believe that there is a transcendent personal cause of the physical universe and a transcendent personal cause of the contingent universe, this is enough to be intellectually dangerous to atheism.

In any case, God (or at least an eternal, transcendent, metaphysically necessary, personal entity as the external cause of the physical/contingent universe) explains why there is something rather than nothing, why the physical universe exists, and why the contingent universe exists. If nothing else, theism has a certain explanatory scope for things that the atheist has no satisfactory explanation for (assuming the atheist is unwilling to concede e.g. a transcendent personal cause of the physical universe).

< Prev   |   1   |   2   |   3   |   4   |   5   |   Next >



Comment on this article