Saturday, May 27, 2017

Transgenderism, Transracialism, and Academic Bigotry (p. 2)

Transgenderism, Transracialism, and Academic Bigotry
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Academic Bigotry



Even though Tuvel is very much on the side of transgenderism, the fact that she agrees with premise (1) of this argument is going to ruffle feathers on the pro-transgenderism side:
  1. If we should accept transgender individuals’ gender identity when it differs from their biological sex, then we should also accept transracial individuals’ racial identity when it differs from their biological race.
  2. We should accept transgender individuals’ gender identity when it differs from their biological sex.
  3. Therefore, we should also accept transracial individuals’ racial identity when it differs from their biological race.
To be sure, it is not bigotry or intolerance to disagree with Tuvel’s arguments or points. Intellectual inquiry and academic freedom demand ideas like this be open to question. What is academic bigotry is saying we should censor Tuvel’s views from the academic literature.

Bigotry exists on both the far left and on the far right, though in this case it seems to come from the left. An open letter calling for the retraction of Tuvel’s article was made. As New York Magazine notes however:
What’s remarkable about this letter is that, as Justin Weinberg noted in the Daily Nous, a philosophy website, each and every one of the falsifiable points it makes is, based on a plain reading of Tuvel’s article, simply false or misleading.
….
There has simply been an explosive amount of misinformation circulating online about what is and isn’t in Tuvel’s article, which few of her most vociferous critics appear to have even skimmed, based on their inability to accurately describe its contents.
Emotional touchiness often breeds irrationality and distorting of the other person’s views. What’s remarkable isn’t just that the misinformation spread and was accepted even by people who should have known better, but that the Associate Editorial Board of Hypatia philosophy journal caved in and expressed regret for having published the article (though thankfully, they did at least refrain from retracting the article). An excerpt from the apology:
Clearly, the article should not have been published, and we believe that the fault for this lies in the review process. In addition to the harms listed above imposed upon trans people and people of color, publishing the article risked exposing its author to heated critique that was both predictable and justifiable.
You might be wondering, “What harms?” Many of the alleged sources of harm seem vague, inapplicable, or outright nonsensical if one is familiar with Tuvel’s actual paper. For example, one of the alleged sources of harms is, “to compare ethically the lived experience of trans people (from a distinctly external perspective) primarily to a single example of a white person claiming to have adopted a black identity creates an equivalency that fails to recognize the history of racial appropriation, while also associating trans people with racial appropriation.” If you’re having trouble following the reasoning about how that’s a source of harm, you’re not alone. José Luis Bermúdez, a philosopher at Texas A & M University, criticizes Hypatia’s claim, among other things pointing out:
This is quite plainly a mischaracterization of what Tuvel is trying to do (as a quick read of her abstract will show). But leaving that aside, the quote shows that the concept of harm has been twisted beyond all recognition. Making a comparison is simply making a comparison -- it is to look at two or more phenomena and identify respects in which they are similar and respects in which they are dissimilar.

Such a comparison can be correct or incorrect. But how can simply making a comparison in itself cause a harm, if it is not explicitly defamatory?
Hypatia’s claim to harm here really is as nonsensical as it might first seem.

Tuvel put forth a response in the Daily Nous containing this:
Calls for intellectual engagement are also being shut down because they “dignify” the article. If this is considered beyond the pale as a response to a controversial piece of writing, then critical thought is in danger. I have never been under the illusion that this article is immune from critique. But the last place one expects to find such calls for censorship rather than discussion is amongst philosophers.
And it’s not just Bermúdez who objected. A lot of academics took issue with how Hypatia handled this. Philosopher Brian Leiter for example wrote:
I confess I've never seen anything like this in academic philosophy (admittedly most signatories to the "open letter" are not academic philosophers, but some are). A tenure-track assistant professor submits her article to a journal, it passes peer review, it is published, others take offense, and the Associate Editors of the journal declare that "Clearly, the article should not have been published" and that the abuse to which the author is being subjected is "both predictable and justifiable."
It’s worth pointing out this is the exception rather than the rule, but this remarkable event is…well, remarkable. A lot of people signed the open letter and spread (mis)information without checking it out first. Even Hypatia mischaracterized Tuvel in the apology. Academic philosophers in particular should have known better than to sign the open letter without fact checking it.

What goes for academic philosophers also goes for anyone else spreading memes and news. When someone makes a point I like on Facebook, I fact check it first before sharing, because I know news that one wants to believe or be outraged about has a real danger of hoodwinking people. If everyone did fact-checking like this, maybe this Hypatia fiasco could have been avoided. By fact checking your own received news before you share it, perhaps you can help prevent the next one.

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Transgenderism, Transracialism, and Academic Bigotry

Transgenderism, Transracialism, and Academic Bigotry
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Rebecca Tuvel’s well-written article called “In Defense of Transracialism” published in the philosophy journal Hypatia spawned quite a bit of ruckus in May 2017. The abstract of this philosophy article contains, “Considerations that support transgenderism seem to apply equally to transracialism [e.g. a white person self-identifying as a black person].” It’s interesting stuff, but because this is such an emotional issue for many and some people are quick to demonize, I feel it’s good to have the following disclaimer.

Disclaimer



When people practice and believe a religion I think is silly, I still think we should not bully such religious people or discriminate against them. I mention this because I think transgender people should enjoy the full civil rights and privileges of people who practice religions I disagree with, and I hope that people who find the transgender beliefs and practices silly can get on board with this sort of tolerance. People who disagree with the transgender lifestyle should do so without malice or bigotry, just as one might do with people of a different faith.

A Please for Civility



With that disclaimer said, the fact that we should tolerate a belief or practice does not make it immune to criticism. My religion should not be immune to criticism, and atheists should be free to think and say my religion is silly without being branded a bigot, because tolerance is not the same as agreement. I look at transgenderism (e.g. an adult biological male self-identifying as a woman and wearing women’s clothing) the same way a tolerant atheist might view my religion; the belief and practice seems kind of crazy to me, but I believe in civil rights and tolerance for such people. For pro-transgender folk who disagree with people like me, I ask that you show the same civility towards me that I show tolerant atheists who think my beliefs and practices are crazy. It is possible for people to think the intellectually opposing side is a little nutty while still getting along. If we can be tolerant and respectful of people of different religions, I think both sides of the transgender issue can show the same tolerance and respect towards each other.

Transgenderism and Transracialism



Remarkably, Rebecca Tuvel is herself on the pro-transgender side. Yet one philosopher’s modus tollens is another philosopher’s modus ponens. Tuvel believes that “since we should accept transgender individuals’ decisions to change sexes, we should also accept transracial individuals’ decisions to change races” whereas someone else might reason, “Since the transracial lifestyle is a crazy idea, we should also find the transgender lifestyle a crazy idea.” Instead, Tuvel concludes that “that if some individuals genuinely feel like or identify as a member of a race other than the one assigned to them at birth—so strongly to the point of seeking a transition to the other race—we should accept their decision to change races.” We can summarize Tuvel’s logic as follows:
  1. If we should accept transgender individuals’ gender identity when it differs from their biological sex, then we should also accept transracial individuals’ racial identity when it differs from their biological race.
  2. We should accept transgender individuals’ gender identity when it differs from their biological sex.
  3. Therefore, we should also accept transracial individuals’ racial identity when it differs from their biological race.
Tuvel’s article is worth reading in its entirety, but I’ll summarize some points Tuvel makes in her article before commenting on the academic bigotry that ensued here. Part of Tuvel’s paper is that arguments against transracialism could be used against transgenderism. Consider the case of a biologically white woman wishing to self-identify as a black woman. (Tuvel seems to have chosen this example because Rachel Dolezal made headlines as a biologically white woman claiming the black identity, though in the paper Tuvel expresses skepticism on whether Dolezal’s claim to black identity is legitimate.) Unless otherwise mentioned, all quotes are from Tuvel’s paper.

Objection: A biologically white woman “cannot identify as black because she did not grow up with the experience of anti-black racism.”

Rebuttal: Tuvel points out that “it remains unclear why one's past experience with racism is required for one's current status as black.” Moreover, “this objection would also apply to trans women [biological males who self-identify as women] who transitioned later in life but did not grow up knowing what it was like to experience sexism.”

Objection: A biologically white woman “cannot identify as black because of the way society currently understands racial membership.” Rebuttal: Tuvel invites us to “imagine a transgender person born in a country today where such forms of identification are not tolerated, because the understanding of sex-gender identity is firmly restricted to the genitalia one possesses at birth.” Would that invalidate the transgender person’s claim? Moreover, “if we hold the legitimacy of a particular act hostage to the status quo…it is difficult to see how we can make any social progress at all.” Objection: It is “insulting or otherwise harmful to the black community for a white person to identify as black.” Consider for example the nineteenth century American white people who engaged in blackface to mock African-Americans. Rebuttal: Racists nineteenth century white Americans engaging in blackface to denigrate African-Americans is very different from someone who genuinely identifies as black. The former “is appropriately deemed pretense because it relies on the fact that this person's core identity is not who she publicly and permanently purports to be.” We must be careful to distinguish such pretense from sincere conviction and non-nefarious intent, because if we don’t, “then by parity of reasoning, transgender men and women are just pretending to be men and women.” Also, “someone who genuinely identifies with blackness could perhaps be viewed as affirming blackness instead of insulting it, insofar as this suggests it is desirable to be black.” Objection: It is “a wrongful exercise of white privilege for a white-born person, such as Dolezal, to cross into the black racial category.” A white person self-identifying as black could become white again and enjoy white privilege. Rebuttal: Regarding “the point that a white-born person could always exercise white privilege by returning to being white, I note that the same argument would problematically apply to a male-to-female (mtf) trans individual who could return to male privilege” and yet “the fact that a person could potentially return to male privilege does and should not preclude their transition.” Also, “it is difficult to see how giving up one's whiteness and becoming black is an exercise of white privilege.”

How’s the Paper, Maverick?



I won’t pretend the paper is perfect but Tuvel raises some good points worthy of publication in a peer-reviewed philosophy journal. I have found it awfully arbitrary that self-identifying as a gender different from your biological sex is socially acceptable but self-identifying as a different race isn’t. It’s nice to see someone on the pro-transgender side recognize the problem even if I disagree with her conclusion.

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Sunday, December 4, 2016

Post Debate Reflections (p. 4)

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Post Debate Reflections
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Post Debate Reflections (p. 4)



The Bad



While there some aspects of the debate were good, some were bad. The debate had a number of red herrings. SeekSecularism defined the “Epistemic Thesis” by noting we believe in morality due to “rational intuition” (we intuit its existence and it’s a rational intuition). Recall that the Unbiased Atheist has no intuition of morality’s existence or nonexistence. With that in mind, consider these four of SeekSecularism’s objections to why the Unbiased Atheist is not a good vantage point to evaluate Pr(not-M|A&K), i.e. the objective evidential relation between not-M and A&K.
  1. SeekSecularism says the vantage point of the Unbiased Atheist is incompatible with the “Epistemic Thesis” in the sense that this vantage point excludes the a priori intuition of OMO existing. This seems irrelevant given what Pr(not-M|A&K) means. Remember, K can’t include any alleged a priori knowledge that OMO exists, just as it can’t include any alleged a priori knowledge that OMO does not exist.
  2. SeekSecularism says, “Any reason to be skeptical of moral intuitions would be reason to be skeptical of all rational intuitions,” and provides no justification for this claim. Suppose a theist claimed that “Any reason to be skeptical of my intuition that God exists would be reason to be skeptical of all rational intuitions.” An atheist might reply this isn’t true because while the objective evidence suggests that people’s intuitions of gods are delusory, the same does not go for all rational intuitions in general. Similarly, the AftUA suggests that while the objective evidence (on atheism) suggests that people’s intuitions of moral oughtness existing are delusory, the same does not go for all rational intuitions in general.
  3. SeekSecularism says, “My beliefs regarding evaluative facts are epistemically prior to my belief that God does not exist.” Maybe, but this seems irrelevant.
  4. SeekSecularism says, “My a priori knowledge of evaluative facts is not influenced by my a posteriori reasons for rejecting God’s existence.” Maybe, but this seems irrelevant.
Objections 3 and 4 were red herrings, though they are somewhat related to the issue at hand. Some red herring fallacies work by arguing for a similar but nonetheless different point from the actual topic, thereby engendering a greater chance of hoodwinking the audience.

Objection 1 was borderline; in a sense it brings up an irrelevant point but can become more relevant if one argues for why having such an intuition is needed for evaluating the objective evidential relation between A&K and not-M. (Though for reasons already mentioned, such an approach would appear doomed.)

Objection 2 raises an important lesson: beware unjustified claims. Seek Secularism claimed, without any justification, that “Any reason to be skeptical of moral intuitions would be reason to be skeptical of all rational intuitions.” One needn’t believe an objector simply because they say something. To be fair, this is sort of a blind spot for me also; I sometimes don’t realize when things aren’t obvious and I neglect to argue for claims I should justify. One of the reasons I find philosophical discussions useful is that it helps me expose such blind spots.

Another thing to take away from the debate when watching someone criticize a deductively valid argument: beware of objections that don’t attack the truth or justification of any premise of the argument. In SeekSecularism’s rebuttal, he said someone he called the “Unbiased Observer,” a person who has a subjectively experienced intuition that morality is real but has neutral intuitions about whether God exists, would accept both atheism and reject moral nihilism. The claim was that this “undercut” premise (P2). But as I pointed out, (P2) just says that the Unbiased Atheist would be justified in believing Pr(not-M|A&K) is high. Showing that someone else would be justified in accepting A and M doesn’t attack the truth or justification for (P2). The Unbiased Observer was largely a red herring. This happened quite a bit in SeekSecularism’s posts; a lot of his responses just didn’t attack the position he was responding too. If someone presents a deductively valid argument, and a person’s rebuttal doesn’t attack the truth or justification of any premise of that argument, you might have a red herring.

Another thing to take away from the debate: beware debaters making demands of their opponents. SeekSecularism said this:
These key points can be seen in the following two propositions:

(a) Glorious pleasure is intrinsically better than excruciating pain.

(b) Nothing is intrinsically motivating.

These two propositions are incompatible, and I take it as obvious that (a) is prima facie more plausible than (b). In order for MaverickXtian’s argument to be successful, the evidences that he presents must make (b) more plausible than (a).
But do I really have to do that for my argument to succeed? Not really; all I have to do is show that the premises of my deductive argument are justifiably true, and if they are justifiably true, then my deductive argument is sound regardless of whether I did anything to show that (b) is more plausible than (a), because that’s just how logic works. If a debater says something along the lines of, “If my opponent doesn’t do such-and-such, I win!” it’s worth taking a moment to think about whether that’s actually true. In this case, I didn’t have to meet SeekSecularism’s demands for my argument to be successful.

The Ugly



For me, what was among the most frustrating things in the debate is how he wouldn’t answer one of my main questions, which was this:
1) It is my view that on atheism the best explanation for why we believe in morality is this: evolution gave humanity physical brains that predispose them to believe in moral oughtness in the environments humanity finds itself in. This atheistic evolutionary explanation doesn’t require morality’s existence (belief in morality has evolutionary value whether it exists or not). You’ve disagreed with the idea that on atheism this evolutionary explanation is the best explanation for why we believe in morality, but then what better explanation is there on atheism that does require morality to exist for us to believe in it?
The idea behind “the best explanation for why we believe in morality’s existence doesn’t require morality’s existence” is that even if moral properties like “moral wrongness” were not associated with the corresponding natural properties, we’d still believe in morality’s existence. This seems plausible on atheism because moral oughtness is causally inert; it’s presence or absence would have no effect on what intuitions our brains would give us, nor would it have any effect on the evolutionary and environmental processes that gave us our brains.

So how did SeekSecularism answer the question? Basically by providing a non-answer. When I ask atheist moral objectivists how on atheism we have genuine knowledge of objective morality’s existence, the answers are sometimes frustratingly vague (almost as if they’re aware of the problem and don’t want to admit it), and SeekSecularism’s response here is sort of an example of this, but fortunately we can get something from this vague response:
Since I believe that morality is a function of reason in general, I consequently think that the correct explanation for why we have veridical moral intuitions will refer to whatever is the explanation for why we have the capacity for reason in general.
If atheism is true, what is the explanation for why we have the capacity for reason in general? Well, it’s evolution giving us physical brains that predispose us to reason in the sorts of environments humanity finds itself in, but this explanation does not require morality’s existence. The presence or absence or moral oughtness’s existence would have no effect on the evolutionary and environmental processes that gave us our physical brains, nor would it have any effect on the physical processes our brains engage in when we reason. So we still have no better explanation (or even any other explanation offered) for why we believe in morality that requires morality’s existence. That is, even if moral properties like “moral wrongness” were not associated with the corresponding natural properties, this would not affect whether we’d have intuitions of morality’s existence.

The situation is analogous to Cyborg Smith’s metal-detecting implant when the objective evidence suggests the implant would give her the intuition that the widget contains metal even if it didn’t contain metal. The intuition would fail to give Smith knowledge that the widget contains metal even if the widget did contain metal. Similarly, if atheism is true our intuition of morality’s existence fails to give us knowledge of morality’s existence if our intuitions are unaffected by whether morality exists.

The failure to provide an answer of how it is on atheism we know of morality’s existence didn’t just poison question 1 but future questions. In question 2, part of what I asked was “On atheism, what is the most plausible explanation you can think of for how our intuition of morality’s existence constitutes genuine knowledge, as opposed to something akin to nature throwing darts on a dartboard to decide which intuitive beliefs we’d get?” The reply? “In regards to a plausible explanation, see my answer to Question 1.” Argh; that reply was annoying.

If nothing else, beware responses that don’t actually answer the question, even if they claim they do. For example, in his reply to question 1, he said, ‘this explanation [for how we have veridical intuitions] would require the existence of moral properties, because otherwise there would be no “true target” for our rational intuitions to converge on.’ These “veridical intuitions” of morality’s existence require morality’s existence only in the sense that if morality did not exist, our intuitions of morality’s existence would not be veridical, and thus would not converge on the truth. However, the proffered explanation does not require morality’s existence in the sense the question was asking, since even if the proffered atheistic explanation is true, the presence or absence of moral oughtness would have no effect on whether we’d have intuitions of morality’s existence; we’d still have the intuitions even if morality did not exist.

Conclusion



Despite some bad and ugly stuff, I think the positives outweigh the negatives of the debate all things considered, largely because from the debate I’ve come away with a better way to present and defend the argument. This debate inspired a major rework of my Does Objective Morality Exist If God Does Not Exist? article.





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