No Free Will Means No Rationality

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The claim that “No statement is rational to believe,” is self-defeating, since it implies that the claim itself is not rational to believe. In this article I’ll argue that the view that we have no free will undermines rationality, and so undercuts itself, albeit in a somewhat indirect way. The following quote from J.B.S. Haldane (1892-1964) has some relevance to this matter, since if we have no free will then our thoughts and beliefs are determined by physical processes:

It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true….And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms.[1]

In philosophy, the view that all our thoughts, actions, and beliefs are determined by processes outside our control and that we have no free will is called hard determinism. This is contrast to soft determinism, which affirms determinism but also claims we are in fact responsible for our behavior (I attacked soft determinism, also known as compatibilism, in The Free Will Argument for the Soul). Hard determinism says that we are never responsible for any of our thoughts and beliefs, and it is my contention that this view undermines human rationality.

Ways to Believe

There are at least two ways we can arrive at a belief or course of action. We can decide to do something or accept some belief via reasons that are freely chosen, or our actions and beliefs can be the result of unthinking and impersonal causes of which we have no control over. To illustrate the idea of freely chosen reasons, suppose I have libertarian free will with respect to two options before me: fattening chocolate ice cream and low-fat strawberry frozen yogurt. Both have a reason for me to eat it: for the fattening chocolate ice cream, it tastes better; for the low-fat frozen yogurt, it’s more healthful. Both options are live and available to me, but I freely choose the low-fat frozen yogurt with my reason being “it's better for me.” Nonetheless, that reason is freely chosen. To illustrate the idea of unthinking and impersonal causes, suppose a man believes a certain economic policy is the best one because a strange brain tumor is causing him to think so.

With free will, we are ultimately responsible for our actions, and this at least allows the possibility for our thoughts and beliefs to be the product of our own rational thought (as via freely chosen reasons). In contrast, hard determinism implies that all our thoughts and beliefs are ultimately caused by unthinking and impersonal causes, if for no other reason that all our behavior is ultimately caused by forces outside of ourselves and that we ourselves are never responsible for any of our thoughts and beliefs.[2] Even if we ignore outside forces though, it seems to me that if our minds are purely physical then our mental processes would be wholly the product of (unthinking) atoms in motion. Such beliefs could be true or they could be false, but ultimately such beliefs would not be the product of rational thought but of mindless chemical reactions. Human rationality itself would be undermined, and our beliefs would be no more rational than a toothache.

The Calculator Reply

One of the best rebuttals to this sort of argument I can think of is something I’ll call “the calculator reply.” The calculator is a deterministic system, yet it provides answers in accord with reason. Similarly, our brains are like (albeit imperfect) calculators in that even though they are deterministic, they supply us with rationality.

One thing to remember is this: the claim is not that determinism entails that our beliefs aren’t mostly correct. Rather, the claim is that even if our beliefs are correct, we are not being rational in accepting them. Recall that under hard determinism, mindless and blind physical causes produce all our beliefs, rather than a mind having some control in producing them. Does the calculator argument compensate this to provide us with rationality? Consider this hypothetical set of scenarios in which astronauts find an alien species that mindlessly accepts any belief given to them. Also suppose we separate these aliens into groups A and B.

Scenario 1: We write down mathematical statements on slips of paper and give them to the aliens in the following manner: we give group A slips of paper that convey false beliefs like “2 + 2 = 5,” and also via paper slips we give group B true mathematical beliefs (having their source in rational individuals like ourselves) like “2 + 2 = 4.” Is group B more rational than group A? No, both are accepting beliefs thoughtlessly and without one iota of rational reflection.

Scenario 2: Suppose we give group A calculators that consistently give incorrect answers such as “2 + 2 = 5” and group B calculators that produce consistently correct answers. Both groups mindlessly accept the answers the calculators give them. Is group B being more rational than group A in accepting their beliefs? Again, the answer is no.

Scenario 3: Now suppose we implant the calculators within the heads of the aliens where their little head tentacles press the buttons and the calculators feed them the answers through neurochemical reactions. Group A is given the faulty calculators and group B is given the good calculators. Once again, both groups mindlessly accept whatever beliefs are given to them by these calculators. Not much has changed here other than the physical location of the calculators, so is group B behaving more rationally than group A? I think again the answer is no.

We can present the argument more formally as follows, where the if-then statement in premise (4) uses the material conditional.

(1)	In scenario 1, group B is no more rational than group A.
(2)	In scenario 2, group B is no more rational than group A.
(3)	In scenario 3, group B is no more rational than group A.
(4)	If (1), (2), and (3) are true, then on hard determinism one’s brain operating in accord with reason is not a sufficient condition for genuine rationality.
(5)	Conclusion: on hard determinism, one’s brain operating in accord with the reason is not a sufficient condition for genuine rationality.

Again, (4) is using the material conditional, which means the only way it can be false is if (1), (2), and (3) are true and one’s brain operating in accord with reason is not a sufficient condition for genuine rationality is false.

Here’s the reasoning behind premise (4): We can give aliens slips of paper whose answers are in accord with reason, but if they are mindlessly accepting whatever beliefs are presented to them, then it isn’t real rationality. Similarly, it seems that chemical reactions doing the same sort of thing to the group B aliens (whether in the manner specified in Scenario 3 or a more organic calculator integrated into the brain), then it isn’t real rationality. Making the calculators an organic part of the brain for the aliens in groups A and B doesn’t seem to make a relevant difference in making group B more rational than group A. If that’s true, then a brain operating in accord with reason is not a sufficient condition for genuine rationality.

The above deductive argument is logically valid, which means the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises by the rules of logic, and so a false conclusion requires a false premise. But all the premises seem to be true, and if so then the conclusion is true.

Conclusion

It is metaphysically possible for hard determinism to be true and for us to have correct beliefs. Yet even if we had consistently correct beliefs, hard determinism still undermines rationality. We simply have no reason to accept our beliefs as true if they are all solely the product mindless, blind physical causes.

It’s important to note what I am not arguing for in this article. The argument is not that if hard determinism is true, then our beliefs are mostly false. Rather, the argument is that if hard determinism is true, human rationality doesn’t exist. Our beliefs could still be true, but we wouldn’t be rational in accepting them any more than our hypothetical aliens are. We thus have the following sort of argument against hard determinism.

1. If hard determinism is true, then human rationality does not exist.
2. Human rationality does exist.
3. Therefore, hard determinism is false.

Note that if human rationality does not exist, we are not rational in accepting any belief, including hard determinism. Again, rationality is not required for accepting true beliefs (though it is recommended) and this argument doesn’t say that we can’t have true beliefs on hard determinism. With that said, in my next entry I’ll introduce the evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN), which says (among other things) that given evolution and naturalism, the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable is low.

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[1] J.B.S. Haldane, Possible Worlds and Other Papers (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1928) p. 220.

[2] This of course wouldn’t apply if a theistic God designs our cognitive faculties to work a certain way to give us beliefs, in which case our thoughts are determined by a thinking mind (viz. the mind of God). In this case I’m referring to a version of hard determinism that assumes naturalism, where there is no supernatural mind guiding the development of our cognitive faculties, so that the external forces that produce our thoughts are mindless and impersonal. Note that the problem of our thoughts and beliefs ultimately being the product of mindless and impersonal causes is not resolved by our brains being the product of a purely physical creator if this creator’s thoughts and beliefs were itself the product of mindless and impersonal causes, since in that case our thoughts and beliefs would still (ultimately) be the result of mindless and impersonal causes.

The Free Will Argument for the Soul

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One argument for the existence of the soul comes from the existence of free will. In this article I’ll argue that the existence of free will implies the existence of the soul.

Free Will

Suppose a dark, gray cloud shoots out lightning that strikes down a heavy tree, which in turn falls down on Bob’s favorite car. Can Bob rightfully blame the tree for the destruction of his car? No, the tree didn’t have a choice in the matter. Its fall was simply caused by the lightning, which was caused static electricity, which resulted from the clouds, which came about by weather patterns etc. Unlike the tree, we humans have a special ability that can cause us to be responsible for our actions. Rather than being pipelines for chains of natural causation that go back before our birth, we can initiate our own causal chains. That is the sort of thing I have in mind by free will. First though some philosophy lingo:

• free will: the view that we have control over and are responsible for our actions; thus if we freely do some misdeed, we can properly be held blameworthy for that action.
• determinism: the belief that effects are determined by prior causes. By initial conditionals determining a result I mean that the result couldn’t have been otherwise given the initial conditions, and thus that the initial conditions will always yield the same outcome.
• indeterminism: the view that initial conditions do not determine outcomes, and thus the view that identical initial conditions will not always yield the same outcome.
• hard determinism: the view that determinism is true with respect to our actions and that we have no free will.
• compatibilism: the view that free will and determinism are compatible. This view is also known as soft determinism.
• incompatibilism: the view that free will and determinism are not compatible.
• agency theory: the view that we have free will, that indeterminism is true with respect to our actions such that we can choose among genuine alternatives, and that free will is an act of agent-causation whereby an agent (person, self) causes effects.

Compatibilism Considered

By my lights agency theory is the correct and commonsense view of free will. But what about compatibilism? If we are purely physical beings who have free will, it seems that compatibilism would be true since if our minds are merely our brains, then electrochemical reactions cause all of our behavior, and these electrochemical reactions are determined by the laws of chemistry and physics. But if we are purely physical beings it seems to me we would not have free will. Consider for example our very first brain state, BS1 being short for “brain state 1,” as follows:

1. BS1: determined by circumstances prior to your mental existence and thus by circumstances you had no control over; thus whatever BS1 was, it was not up to you.
2. BS2: your second brain state is determined by BS1 (which you had no control over) and the laws of chemistry and physics (which you have no control over), and thus whatever BS2 was, it was not up to you.
3. BS3: your third brain state is determined by BS2 (which you had no control over) and the laws of chemistry and physics (which you have no control over), and thus whatever BS3 was, it was not up to you.

And on and on it goes for all of your future brain states. This all seems to imply that if we are purely physical creatures, then our brain states—and thus our mental states—are not up to us at all. They are determined entirely by forces outside of our control. We would merely be pipelines and puppets of natural causation that extend outside of us and even before we were born.

A compatibilist could dismiss this as all too simplistic; BS2 was brought about by BS1, which is itself a prior brain state. While determinism is true with respect to our behavior, a compatibilist could argue that our inner brain states that cause our actions come about via our desires, including the desires for our own actions, and what more could we ask for then our actions taking place in accordance with our wants? Wouldn’t we be doing what we want to do? Part of free will however is being responsible for our actions in the sense that if morality exists, we are morally accountable for our actions. If we are being held accountable for our actions because of our wants, but we had no control over what our wants would be (or what those wants would result in), it seems we wouldn’t really have the type of accountability that would lead us to be morally responsible for our actions; it would seem too much like mind control.

To illustrate, consider for example the first brain state of a person in which a compatibilist would hold that person responsible for that person’s actions, thoughts, etc., BSR1. Why should we hold the person accountable for what BSR1 produced because of the desires present in BSR1 when whatever those desires are, they are entirely beyond the person’s control? It would be like holding a man responsible for what a heart attack produces when the heart attack was beyond the person’s control. If we should not hold the person having BSR1 accountable for what BSR1 results in, then anything produced by BSR1, including subsequent brain states, can’t be correctly held accountable to the person who has BSR1. But then the same would go for the next brain state one is putatively responsible for, BSR2, since the desires present in that brain state were also outside of the person’s control. To describe this in a more orderly fashion, let BSR1 represent your own first brain state in which a compatibilist would hold you accountable for your actions:

1. BSR1: the desires in BSR1 are determined by circumstances entirely beyond your control (this is true even on compatibilism!). Whatever the desires are, they are beyond your control, and whatever those desires produce (thanks to the laws of chemistry and physics) are also beyond your control. Thus, whatever comes about from BSR1 is also beyond your control.
2. BSR2: the desires present in BSR2 (if line 1 is true) are outside of your control, for they were produced by BSR1 (something outside of your control) and the laws of chemistry and physics (also beyond your control). Thus whatever the desires are, they are beyond your control, and whatever those desires produce (thanks to the laws of chemistry and physics) are also beyond your control. Thus, whatever comes about from BSR2 is also beyond your control.

And on and on it goes. In sum, the idea that our actions take place according with our desires isn’t real freedom—at any rate not the sort of freedom that allows us to be morally responsible for our actions—when our desires are not up to us and what those desires result in is also not up to us. Compatibilism is therefore false.

Free Will and the Soul

If we were purely physical beings with free will, compatibilism would be true, but compatibilism is not true, so if we are purely physical beings then we do not have free will. Yet if we do indeed have free will, the following deductive argument presents itself:

1. If we are purely physical beings, then we do not have free will.
2. We do have free will.
3. Therefore, we are not purely physical beings.

The best alternative to hard determinism, it seems to me, is agency theory, where it is we who cause our own actions, and we cause actions in a way such that we are not determined by prior causes. But for this to work the essence of “we” has to be nonphysical, otherwise free will doesn’t exist (confer the deductive argument above). But the nonphysical essence of oneself is by definition the soul (at least, that is how I am defining the term “soul”). On this view, our souls (which is really and essentially “us”) are to some degree capable of working “outside” the corporeal tapestry so we can initiate our own causal chains and create effects that are not determined by prior causes.

An objector could accept premise (1) but bite the bullet and say we do not have free will. But as I’ll argue in my next post, no free will means no rationality.

Mary the Colorblind Brain Scientist

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One objection that could be launched against the argument made in my previous article on Plantinga’s argument against materialism is that the semantic content of a belief (e.g. the belief that snow is white) just is the neurophysiological properties associated with that belief. One could also hold the same view with experiences, e.g. that a sensation of redness just is the set of neurophysiological properties associated with that sensation. While Plantinga does have a response to this sort of view in his argument (I oversimplified his argument a bit for space), against this variety of materialism another sort of argument is appropriate.

Suppose Mary is a colorblind brain scientist who has been colorblind her whole life and she knows all the neurophysiological properties of the brain, as well as everything there is to know about the electromagnetic spectrum. A man is looking at a red light, and she monitors the man’s brain while he is having the sensation of redness, such that she knows all the neurophysiological properties involved in the man sensing redness. And yet (so it is argued) if this happened she still wouldn’t know what it’s like to perceive redness due to her colorblindness. This suggests that although certain physical states might cause someone to have a sensation of redness, it is not the case that the redness sensation just is the neurophysiology, because our hypothetical brain scientist would know all about the neurophysiology without knowing what it’s like to perceive redness.